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THE ‘HOME COUNTRY’ OF A MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
GROUP FACING INSOLVENCY*
Identifying the ‘home country’ for the multinational enterprise group’s insolvency
proceedings can be crucial for allowing an effective insolvency process for related
entities. However, this is a challenging task given the diversity of group structures
and insolvency scenarios. This article attempts to deal with this issue by applying
alternatives of ‘insolvency venues’ to the group case and confronting them with key
insolvency goals, to assess which standard venue could most effectively enhance cost
efﬁciency, predictability and transparency of the rules (regarding jurisdiction), control
forum shopping and accord with creditors’ legitimate expectations. The paper suggests
that operational headquarters is in principle the most efﬁcacious test for multinational
groups, yet it also points out its limitations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Promoting key insolvency goals in the context of insolvency within multinational
enterprise groups (MEGs) heavily relies on the adoption of a global approach to
handling such proceedings. This is particularly pronounced in respect of maintaining
fair and efﬁcient international insolvency regime, but also in enhancing certainty and
predictability and preventing forum shopping.1 A ‘global approach’ in this context
implies taking a worldwide perspective on the MEG insolvency which may also in-
volve a disregard of the corporate form to a certain extent. In other words, it suggests
a ‘groupwide’ concept. In appropriate cases (crucially when dealing with an integrated
MEG or any integrated part thereof) a centralized process could be the most effective
way forward for an insolvent MEG. This may imply handling the insolvency pro-
ceedings of the various entities from a single jurisdiction and under a single legal
regime. Consequently, reducing costs of parallel proceedings, and facilitating the co-
ordination of a global sale of assets or the orchestration of reorganization on a group
scale. Furthermore, even when subsidiaries are signiﬁcantly independent and a local
process is both efﬁcient and fair, it may still be beneﬁcial for the various proceedings to
be supervised and coordinated from a single jurisdiction.2 Which ever is the case, it
should be emphasized that handling (or supervising) the insolvency proceedings from a
single jurisdiction does not necessarily entail substantive consolidation of the insol-
vency estates.3 In fact, in most scenarios ‘a consolidation of the cases’ (consolidating
the procedural aspect of the insolvency rather than the actual entities) would be the
necessary and sufﬁcient mechanism to facilitate the insolvency process. This way a
particular court presides over all the cases and one ofﬁce-holder (or a bundle of joint
administrators) is appointed for the various debtors (hence, a joint administration of the
* This article is based on a paper presented at INSOL International Conference in Cape Town,
South Africa (March 2007). The author is grateful for the assistance of Professor Ian Fletcher and
for helpful comments of colleagues in attendance at the Cape Town meeting.
1 See I Mevorach, ‘The road to a suitable and comprehensive global approach to insolvencies
within multinational corporate groups’ [2006] 15 JBLP 455, 463–64 and 466–530.
2 ibid 466–530. See also I Mevorach, ‘Centralizing insolvencies of pan-European corporate
groups: a creditor’s dream or nightmare?’ [2006] JBL 468.
3 Combining the assets and liabilities of the afﬁliates in the course of insolvency.
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afﬁliated companies’ proceedings can be held). However, crucially each company
remains separate in the course of insolvency, and creditors recover their claims from
the particular entity to which they belong.4
Taking such a ‘global approach’ to cases of MEG insolvency not only implies taking
an enterprise-law point of view in this respect (as opposed to strict adherence to ‘entity
law’) but also that the ‘enterprise’ (the group as a whole) has a single common geo-
graphical locus and that such a locus may be identiﬁed. Evidently, determining the
‘home country’ of the enterprise group as such (namely the proper venue from which
the ‘group insolvency process’ could be jointly handled, or supervised) is a funda-
mental challenge to the application of a ‘global approach’. The main hurdle here is that
any such deﬁnition of the ‘home country’ would need to accommodate a variety of
situations and possible scenarios and at the same time support the fulﬁlment of the
insolvency goals (eg maintain cost-efﬁciency and predictability and prevent forum
shopping). Indeed, it has been argued5 that the Achilles’ heel of universalism is the
difﬁculty to apply it to multinational groups, in particular the indeterminacy of the
home country issue in this regard. Arguably, ‘the greatest uncertainty as to the meaning
of ‘home country’ results from the fact that most large ﬁrms are not single entities, but
corporate groups’.6
Evidently, there is no ready-made ‘home country’ concept of an MEG. Thus far,
cross-border insolvency models have not provided an answer for the question of proper
jurisdiction in cases of international corporate groups. The EU Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings7 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency8 do not deal explicitly with the issue of enterprise groups.9 The ALI
Principles10 do allow for a subsidiary to open insolvency proceedings in the parent’s
jurisdiction, yet this place does not necessarily reﬂect the proper venue of the group,
4 This tool is available in several national laws. In Canada and the US, for example, it is
counted as essential that corporate groups will be subjected to a joint administration (procedural
consolidation) when a ﬁnancially distressed group seeks to reorganize itself (see DG Baird,
‘Substantive Consolidation Today’ (2005) 1 Bost Col L Rev 5, 6. (on procedural consolidation in
the United States); JS Ziegel, ‘Corporate Groups and Crossborder Insolvencies: A Canada–United
States Perspective’ [2002] 7 Fordham J Corprate & Financial L 367, 376 (explaining that pro-
cedural consolidation ‘is almost de rigueur’ in Canada and US corporate groups’ reorganizations).
In the UK, as a matter of practice, coordination of group insolvency may be achieved via the
appointment of an insolvency representative to two or more members of the same group.
5 See LM LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’
[1999] 84 Cornell L Rev 696 [hereinafter: LoPucki, Cooperation]; LM LoPucki, ‘Universalism
Unravels’ [2005] 79 American Bankruptcy L J 143.
6 LoPucki, Cooperation (n 5) 716.
7 Council Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (<http://www.europa.eu.
int/eur-lex>) [hereinafter: EU Regulation].
8 UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to enactment, UN Sales No E.99.V.3 (<http://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf>) [hereinafter: UNCITRAL Model
Law].
9 However, the topic of enterprise groups in insolvency is currently under consideration
by UNCITRAL working group V (insolvency law) (see documents and reports of 31st–
39th sessions of working group V, available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html>).
10 The American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Cooperation among the NAFTA
Countries (2003) [hereinafter: ALI Principles].
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and it is only provided as an option for each subsidiary separately.11 Hence, the ALI
too lacks a comprehensive treatment of groups. Therefore, the proper venue for MEG
insolvency, which is invoked by the application of a ‘global approach’, has to be
thoroughly considered. It is the aim of this paper to address this issue and consequently
to suggest the criteria for identifying this potential locus while at the same time
specifying any limitations it may hold. It will be done by ﬁrst delineating the evalu-
ation method of the possible alternatives for the proper venue and subsequently dis-
cussing those alternatives. Other questions pertinent to international groups in
insolvency such as the appropriate remedies that should be available during the in-
solvency process itself are outside the scope of this paper. However, before venturing
forth, another preliminary issue must be addressed. That is, the nature of the multi-
national group with which we are dealing and for which a ‘home country’ needs to be
identiﬁed. Obviously, this should be clariﬁed in order to come up with a competent test
for the proper venue. Later on, we will also discuss particular circumstances in which a
single venue for the MEG insolvency can not be located or where the test provided is
impractical or inappropriate and alternative tests for identifying the venue need to be
applied.
II. THE SCENARIO OF MEG IN INSOLVENCY AND THE FACTOR OF INTEGRATION
We have referred above to ‘an MEG’ and ‘an integrated MEG’; however, these two
terms need further clariﬁcation in the context of this paper before embarking on
the quest for the proper forum for the MEG. With respect to the phenomenon of an
MEG, it should be considered whether we are going to have as our subject-matter only
‘equity based’ groups, or whether we should include other business structures as well.
In addition we need to identify what would constitute the international dimension of
such groups. Furthermore, as integration is supposedly the speciﬁc attribute of an
MEG that dictates whether identiﬁcation of a proper venue in the insolvency of
group members’ case will be a relevant issue, it should be clariﬁed what sort of MEG
attributes reﬂect on its level of integration. This is also linked to the question of what
parts of the group will we look at when choosing the place in which to handle the
proceedings.
A. The Multinational Enterprise Group (MEG)
Worldwide business operating via a bundle of linked undertakings may take various
legal forms, though two main broad types of structure can be identiﬁed. One type is the
‘equity-based’ form of multinational enterprises. It may occur in the classic ‘pyramid’
form of ownership that crosses borders, or alternatively as transnational mergers in
which two or more parent ﬁrms integrate their business operations and jointly hold a
company. Additional example could take the form of cross-shareholding groups
coupled with coordinated management.12 The other type is the ‘contractual-based’
form of MEGs which emphasizes contractual linkages between foreign companies or
11 ALI Principles, Procedural Principle 23.
12 Developed in Japan (see PT Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell,
Oxford, 2007) 63–65).
Multinational Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency 429
international ‘network organizations’.13 Such structures can be achieved in various
ways, for instance via the establishment of distribution franchise alliances, or by
licensing production rights as part of a production franchise package.14 It should be
noted that multinational enterprises may be structured as supranational forms of in-
ternational business, but this is just a particular type of a single corporation.15
Certainly, such types of supranational entities can be part of a group in which the top
company can be supranational as well or a national one. To summarize, ﬁrms may
subdivide their economic activities among separate entities operating in different
countries in a variety of legal patterns (such as networks and other type of interrela-
tions) rather than exclusively relying on the basic equity based ‘pyramid’ form. In
terms of the international aspect, a multinational group is a group whose constituents
(two or more) are established or centred in different countries, so that they may be
subjected to different jurisdictions if they were to be looked at separately.
Evidently, all these various structures involve a number of undertakings that are
linked in some form or another. As a result, a degree of control or coordination may
potentially occur in any of the above legal patterns. Thus, for instance, parent and
subsidiaries (linked by equity) may altogether operate a single business, or parents may
be signiﬁcantly involved in the management of the subsidiaries. Crucially however,
this may also happen where an international business is carried on by means of con-
tract, where there may still emerge a relationship of control or coordination.16
Indeed, economists have suggested that trans-national businesses may be tied by
contract rather than equity and may be organized with a high degree of decentraliza-
tion. The vital link can thus be control, (actual, or capacity to control) or coordination
between (or over) equity or contractually based entities, even when it is exerted over
autonomous action centres.17 National laws refer to various features as sufﬁcient to
create a group. These normally include elements of ownership and control. Yet as most
jurisdictions do not have speciﬁc laws tailored to corporate groups there is normally
absence of a coherent deﬁnition for groups (domestic or international).18
Reinforcement to the use of a broad meaning to MEGs can be found in the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,19 which allows for either coordination or
13 As such associations were described by Teubner (see eg G Teubner, ‘The many-headed
Hydra: networks as higher order collective actors’ in J McCahery and S Picciotto and C Scott
(eds), Corporate Control and Accountability (OUP, Oxford, 1993) 41).
14 Muchlinski (n 12) 53–54.
15 See the initiatives within the EC: the Statute for a European company (SE) (Council
Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001, OJ L 294/1, 10.11.2001) and Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85
of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)//[1985] OJ L 199/1.
16 Muchlinski (n 12) 152–153.
17 See eg, JH Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, 1993) 3.
18 See eg, English Companies Act which offers no formal deﬁnition of a group, though it seeks
to deﬁne the key players within a group. For certain purposes the deﬁnition refers to group of
undertakings embracing an elaborated list of optional connecting factors that can establish a
parent undertaking (including the power to exercise dominant inﬂuence or the fact that the parent
and subsidiary are managed on a uniﬁed basis (Companies Act 1985 (UK) s 258, replaced by s
1162 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK)). For other purposes the deﬁnitions is narrower and refers
only to body corporate (Companies Act 1985 (UK) s 736, replaced by s 1159 of the Companies
Act 2006 (UK)).
19 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 27 June 2000 (<http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>).
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control to be the possible manifestation of linkage between the entities comprising the
international group, and suggests that the amount of inﬂuence and control over the
entities may differ between enterprises with different degrees of autonomy enjoyed by
them.20
It is suggested here that for our purposes, a lenient approach to the phenomenon of
an MEG should be adopted, as a starting point. Indeed, any of the above mentioned
legal forms may bring about an insolvency scenario of multiple debtors in a number of
countries (if the enterprise or any part thereof collapses) which are linked, and there-
fore may require the application of a worldwide perspective to the group’s insolvency.
Furthermore, it would be of limited practical value to apply such a centralized ap-
proach as was mentioned in the Introduction only to certain sorts of group structures
(for instance the equity based ones). Such a ‘limited’ approach will permit certain
MEGs to evade legal consequences (in the context of insolvency) as well as prohibit
MEGs from the beneﬁts a global approach may propose, if their operational structure
is different than the ‘basic’ traditional one. Hence, a limited method that applies only
to a restricted version of the MEG will lack generality and will be less effective.
For our present context we therefore consider any group comprised of a number of
enterprises21 established or centred in more than one country as long as those are
mutually connected either by common or interlocking shareholding or via contract,
so that they can be controlled or may coordinate their businesses.
Our starting point is a very wide one which encompasses any possible structure
that supports a group operation. However, whereas different structural mechanisms
may bring about the need to link between connected entities in the course of
insolvency, it is only when the multinational enterprise is functionally integrated
and under insolvency (or any part thereof ) that assigning a single venue becomes
necessary.22
B. The Integration Factor of MEGs
When considering the application of a centralized approach to the MEG insolvency, it
becomes clear that it should be speciﬁcally directed at those MEGs in which the
various components comprising the group are signiﬁcantly functionally linked.
Accordingly, the need to identify a proper venue is particularly pronounced in the case
of an ‘integrated’ MEG. More speciﬁcally, the term Integrated MEG refers to those
worldwide enterprises that were managed as a group, jointly operating a coordinated
single business or even centrally controlled one. The case of an MEG in which
the various components were inter-linked resulting with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
and administrative interdependence may also be included under this term.23 However,
20 ibid, ‘Concepts and Principles’, 3.
21 The multinational group may comprise of companies or other forms of undertakings. The
typical scenario though is the group of companies, on which the paper is mainly focused.
22 We may need though to look at other parts of the MEG (that were not necessarily integrated
with the rest and not under insolvency) for other issues pertaining to its insolvency, such as the
issue of group liability—where the question is whether one member should be responsible for the
debts of another (see Mevorach (n 1) 515–19). However, this is outside the scope of this paper.
23 In conglomerate groups that operate diversiﬁed businesses the group structure may be used
for various reasons other than the imposition of a single business strategy; however this sort
of enterprises may in fact operate in an integrated way through ﬁnancial and administrative
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this does not necessitate that the entities are commingled or very highly interdependent
(this type of groups can be referred to as strongly integrated MEGs).
Integrated MEGs may be hierarchically structured with senior decision making
centralized, so that the entire enterprise is controlled from a single place (we will refer
to those as ‘integrated centralized groups’), typically through the parent company.
Alternatively, they can operate in a more decentralized manner. It often happens that,
when a ﬁrm becomes multinational the division of responsibilities and tasks between
the headquarters, regional ofﬁces and afﬁliates changes.24 In cases where the need to
coordinate the global activities is important the locus of decision taking remains in
the centre, though the role of the head ofﬁce may change. Instead of the ultimate
policy-maker and directing ‘brain’ the headquarters will act as coordinator and iden-
tiﬁer of new business opportunities and the creator of task force networks within
the ﬁrm.25 Where the managements of local units need a great deal of local information
the locus of decision taking may be largely decentralized to regional ofﬁces and/or
local afﬁliates. Nevertheless, even this latter case in which the group is managed
through a decentralised operational mechanism can fall under our deﬁnitions
of integrated MEG if the group components coordinated a single business or
were signiﬁcantly inter-linked. Additionally, certain parts of the group may be
centralized (a regional division for instance) while the group as a whole is decen-
tralized.
In any case, if the group was conducted as an integrated one in the ordinary course
of business proﬁtable ‘cross-entity’ insolvency solutions are very likely to be attainable
and thus it would be beneﬁcial to operate a joint insolvency process. Whether for the
purpose of liquidation or reorganization, it will often be beneﬁcial to link between the
separate entities, their assets and businesses ‘mimicking’ the MEG’s ‘real’ way of
conducting the business in its ‘golden days’ and its operational links. This linkage in
the course of the insolvency procedure will broaden the opportunities available to the
stakeholders.
Finally, we should clarify which parts of the integrated group will be included in our
joint insolvency process and for which we will need to locate the proper forum.
Insolvency should receive here a broad interpretation, taking into account the special
characteristic of a group and the integration between the relevant members. In fact,
integration and insolvency are interdependent in this context. The solvency of a par-
ticular entity may be very much contingent upon the ﬁnancial situation of other group
members, to the extent that it is an integrated group. The ﬁnancial state of a member of
a group may jeopardize the ﬁnancial survival of other afﬁliates. Liquidation of a par-
ticular component may have a damaging effect upon the reputation of the rest of the
group. It may also affect the ﬁnancial viability of the others resulting with a ‘domino
effect’ leading to a total shutdown. Therefore, the insolvent group to which we are
referring comprises all those entities that are insolvent or on the verge of insolvency or
are likely to enter insolvency following the insolvency of other group members.
In sum, our subject-matter is any sort of MEG, within which we will look for
the insolvent integrated parts (for the purpose of centralization and consolidation).
interdependence. (see PI Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: the search
for a new corporate personality (OUP, Oxford, 1993) 144–45).
24 See Dunning (n 17) 223. 25 See Muchlinski (n 12) 48.
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Non-integrated parts of the group or truly solvent entities will normally be excluded, at
least initially, subject to new information being revealed. It should be remembered that
an insolvency case is dynamic and further in the process it may appear beneﬁcial to
tighten the linkage between the insolvencies.
III. THE SORT OF VENUE WE ARE LOOKING FOR
After setting the context in terms of the nature of multinational groups we are inte-
rested in, we can now proceed to explore the main question of the present study—what
will constitute the proper venue (or the ‘home country’) of the MEG in distress? It will
be based on the premise set out in the beginning of this paper, that a ‘global approach’
to insolvencies within MEG is a necessity as it will promote key objectives of an
insolvency system, on an international scale. We will now examine what sort of stan-
dard venue could also correspond with such goals, so that it will ﬁt with the idea of
having a system which will promote cost efﬁciency, fairness, certainty and predict-
ability and prevent, or at least reduce, forum shopping. Obviously these goals have
various dimensions; however, we will concentrate here only on those particular aspects
pertaining to the issue of jurisdiction. These aspects will be now discussed.
A. ‘One Would Be More than Enough’: Looking For a Single Substantial Venue
The goal of enhancing economic efﬁciency in the handling of the international insol-
vency of the integrated group26 dictates that our standard venue will be such that it
could refer us to a single location (a ‘group home country’), although we are dealing
with separate entities. This way it will be possible to have a uniﬁed process to the
maximum extent.
The alternative approach of looking for the home country of each related entity
separately, currently taken under the EU Regulation (in the lack of speciﬁc rules for
enterprise groups) may in some cases result with efﬁcient joint administration, when all
entities involved share a mutual COMI.27 However, if the goal is to enable joint pro-
ceedings in a variety of scenarios, providing a standard venue for the group will be
more appropriate. We would then also aim at investigating the entire group at once,
avoiding successive ﬁling by those entities that entered insolvency as a result of the
situation of other members.
It can be argued that there is an intervention here with the corporate form,28 as we
are looking at the group as an ‘entity’ for the purpose of identifying a venue for
insolvency proceedings. However, it should be emphasized that this does not in itself
constitute ‘lifting the veil’ or mixing assets and debts of the separate entities, not in the
26 I refer here to ex post efﬁciency. That is, the ability of the system to maximize the values of
insolvency estates in liquidations and facilitate reorganizations, while minimizing expenses and
delays. Ex ante aspects will be discussed below under the ‘predictability’ goal.
27 That is, the centre of main interests of the debtor company, which is the test adopted in
the Regulation for ascertaining international jurisdiction (Article 3(1) of the EU Regulation).
28 Most pronouncly when dealing with enterprises comprising of companies which are linked
by limited liability share holding. But, an equivalent problem in regard to ‘network’ enterprises
for instance (linked via contracts) could be the interference with the ‘contractual veil’ (on network
organizations see in Teubner (n 13)).
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common scenario at least. As mentioned earlier, when the entities are not intermingled,
the idea—and the ultimate purpose of the process of forum identiﬁcation—is to
consolidate the cases procedurally for coordination purposes, leaving the corporate
form of each entity intact.29
This will also accord with the concept of applying a vigorous use of the ‘doing of
business’ or ‘presence’ criteria of jurisdiction (here in the context of insolvency pro-
ceedings for an MEG). Indeed, it has been suggested, with regard to jurisdiction over
holding companies in countries where their subsidiaries operate and vice versa (whe-
ther creditors of a subsidiary can sue in the home country of the parent) that referring to
each company separately or relying on a pure agency relationship might not be the
ideal solution.30 Similarly, a more ﬂexible test should be applied to the case of re-
lationship between afﬁliate companies in the context of handling insolvency of an
MEG. The focus here should be on the economic reality of the relationship between the
parent and subsidiaries rather than looking at each company separately.
Additionally, in order to enhance the efﬁciency and convenience of the handling of
the joint insolvency process it should be placed in a location with a strong connection
to the various group members. The standard venue should preferably direct us to a
place with most of the relevant documentation and information regarding the group
affairs, whose laws govern the main contracts of the group business and so forth.
B. A Venue which Corresponds with Legitimate Expectations
Certain dimensions of the goal of promoting fairness, particularly those aspects bearing
on the location of proceedings (in the context of international insolvency) demand that
the designated forum will accord with creditors’ legitimate expectations, taking into
account the various groups of creditors involved with an MEG. Namely, the local and
foreign creditors’ viewpoint, and those belonging to a particular company at hand as
well as those related to its afﬁliates should be considered, appreciating the disadvan-
tageous position any of them may have resulting from being located in a foreign
country.31
Indeed, creditors’ legitimate or reasonable expectations are recognized as funda-
mental to the issue of international jurisdiction in which to handle cross-border in-
solvencies.32 An insolvency system should aim at enabling creditors to foresee where
29 See n 4 and accompanying text.
30 See eg PT Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction
and the United Kingdom Asbestos Cases’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 1; LP Kessel ‘Trends in the Approach
to the Corporate Entity Problem in Civil Litigation’ (1953) 41 Georgetown L J 525, 526–32;
JJ Fawcett, ‘Jurisdiction and Subsidiaries’ [1985] JBL 16; JK Rothpletz, ‘Ownership of a
Subsidiary as a basis for jurisdiction’ (1965) 20 New York University Intramural Law Review
127.
31 Thus, treating he creditors as equals (applying ‘real equality’), in the context of ascertaining
the group home country and evaluating creditors’ expectations (see R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue:
The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000) for the
distinction between formal and real equality).
32 In the EU context, the EU Regulation stresses that a major factor in determining where the
main proceedings of a debtor should be taking place is third party expectations (see Recital (13) of
the EU Regulation). The importance of meeting third parties’ legitimate expectations with regard
to jurisdiction to open insolvency proceeding was also expressed in numerous EU Regulation
cases, see eg Geveran Trading Co Ltd v Skjevesland [2003] BCC 209; Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd
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the insolvency of a company is going to take place and calculate their risk accordingly.
Indeed, substantial legal rights (such as the ranking of claims) might be affected by
changing the location of the insolvency proceedings of a particular group member,33 as
well as the ability of creditors to participate in a foreign process. However, as we noted,
in an international group scenario there are various clusters of creditors involved, and
they may be located in different countries. In addition, different creditors may have
different interests and different expectations regarding the location in which a certain
member’s insolvency will be handled. Therefore a desired venue should strive to ac-
cord with the aggregate of expectations in relation to jurisdiction in the entire group.
Yet, it should be appreciated that not all creditors are capable of anticipating juris-
dictional outcomes prior to insolvency, as is the case with involuntary creditors (such
as tort claimants). Hence creditors’ expectations is only one aspect to consider and
balance with other goals and should not be the decisive factor.
C. A predictable Venue
In addition, meeting creditors’ expectations in this way should go hand in hand with
the goal of producing clear, predictable and transparent rules regarding jurisdiction. It
can then increase the chances that different creditors (for example those that belong to
different components of the group) will arrive at the same conclusion regarding juris-
diction. Clarity in this sense will also enhance efﬁciency, as it will reduce jurisdictional
battles (litigation over the issue of jurisdiction resulting from vagueness in the rules).
The ability to predict where the insolvency of the MEG will take place (and accord-
ingly which laws will apply to the case) is also desirable considering ex ante efﬁciency
that is, the facilitation of investment and lending. Therefore, the designated venue
should also be a place easy to identify and to predict, ie the connection between the
MEG and the forum should be sufﬁciently salient and transparent.
D. A Real versus ‘Surreal’ Venue
We have just mentioned the need for predictability in the context of jurisdiction, yet in
global litigation achieving that goal also demands controlling venue shopping at least
to some extent. Certainly, at the outset MEGs are able to choose the forum which later
on will regulate their insolvency, as they are free to structure their business according
to the rules of jurisdiction in the context of insolvency, whatever those rules may be.
What the system should nevertheless avoid in the context of groups is MEGs using the
separateness between entities to subject the group to a particular jurisdiction to which
the group has no real connection, or otherwise subject a particular entity to a juris-
diction to which it has thin connection, by artiﬁcially separating it from the rest of the
group. The venue choice should have ‘group sense’ (in terms of the economic reality)
so long as we are dealing with integrated MEGs. The system should also be concerned
[2003] BCC 562 (Ch D); Re Parmalat Hungary/Slovakia, Municipality Court of Fejer, 14 June
2004; Ci4Net.com Inc [2005] BCC 277 (Ch D); Eurofood IFSC Ltd (ECJ) [2006] BCC 397, paras
33–37.
33 If we will subject the subsidiary to the law of the forum, and since presently there is no
prospect of achieving uniﬁcation of domestic insolvency laws.
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with alterations of the venue at the eve of insolvency, manipulating the order of ﬁling
insolvencies against group members for the purpose of venue choice, and determi-
nation of venue based on biased accounts presented to court by either debtors or
creditors of any group members. These various attempts of manipulating the venue
may be done for the beneﬁt of the group insiders (and perhaps inﬂuential creditors) but
not other mal-adjusting creditors.34 It can also increase litigation and affect predict-
ability of the venue. Hence, the venue should reﬂect a real connection to the insolvent
integrated MEG as a whole from an objective point of view and should be one as much
as possible not easily manipulable, in particular using the group structure for this
purpose.
To summarize, the standard venue should refer us to a single location that reﬂects a
real centre of the group, to which the integrated insolvent group as a whole has con-
nection. At the same time, it is our objective that the designated venue will normally
accord with creditors’ legitimate expectations regarding jurisdiction for insolvency
proceedings (a place which can be regarded as generally foreseeable to voluntary
creditors) and that can be relatively easily identiﬁed and predicted by relevant parties.
IV. ‘MEET THE CANDIDATES’: ALTERNATIVES FOR A PROPER VENUE
Several possible bases for jurisdiction in the context of insolvency (of single debtors)
can be identiﬁed. That is, those tests based on the debtor’s place of incorporation (or
formation, statutory seat or registered ofﬁce),35 the location of principal assets of the
debtor (or its operations or activities), central administration and control (aspects of
management) of the debtor, and centre of main interests (COMI)36 which is rather
vague in its meaning. Evidently, the COMI test is the most prominent one and as such
was incorporated into existing models for cross-border insolvencies of single debtors.37
Its own inherent difﬁculties of deﬁnition and application will be discussed below.
Nevertheless it will be suggested that COMI (of a single debtor) may essentially refer
to ‘central management’. But, ﬁrst let us consider the other factors (incorporation and
assets/activities) as attributions for jurisdiction for single companies.
‘Incorporation’ as jurisdictional basis for insolvency matters seems to loose its
signiﬁcance, mainly because it might not represent any real connection to the debtor.
However, this test still has presence in the debate over the test for jurisdiction (in the
34 See DA Skeel, ‘European Implication of Bankruptcy Venue Shopping in the U.S.’ (2006–7)
54 Buff L Rev 439, 463, suggesting that if managers are permitted to make a venue choice at the
last minute (anticipating insolvency) they may not face the same market discipline they may face
if the ﬁling location is determined in advance.
35 The latter term is used in the EU Regulation (Article 3(1)) and in UNCITRAL Model Law
(Article 16(3)). 36 See n 27.
37 The concept originated in the Council of Europe: Convention on Certain International
Aspects of Bankruptcy (the Istanbul Convention 1990 Art 4(1)) that never entered into force, but
it was subsequently adopted by the working party on the EC Bankruptcy Convention, and then
carried through into the EU Regulation as the test for ascertaining international jurisdiction (see
IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2005) 321). The
UNCITRAL Model Law and the ALI Principles followed and adopted this concept. This already
means a widespread use of the COMI concept, within and outside Europe, as the UNCITRAL
Model Law has already been recognised and adopted by a substantial number of countries around
the world (including recently the US and the UK).
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national and international contexts), and in current international insolvency regimes.
Perkins for instance argues that if a company’s place of incorporation will determine
its home country it would result in a clear rule that would avoid protracted disputes
about the debtor’s principle place of business and will enhance predictability ex ante.38
Yet, though it is true that incorporation can be certain and predictable (at least if there
is sufﬁcient transparency of the information), it may lead us to a place with no real
connection to the debtor, thus defeating ex post efﬁciency.39 Under the EU Regulation
it is presumed that the company’s place of registered ofﬁce is the COMI.40 Similarly,
the UNCITRAL Model Law adopts this presumption when designating the country of
‘main proceedings’.41 However, under these regimes incorporation is not a stand alone
basis for jurisdiction. The presumption can be rebutted under the EU regulation if there
is proof that the COMI is located in some other Member State.42 That is, it is accepted
under these regimes that such formalities as the place of incorporation are not deter-
minative in ascertaining the venue for the insolvency process, but rather functional
realities are key factors.43 Indeed, several EU Regulation cases showed that judges
tend to give lesser weight to the incorporation presumption. For instance, in the case of
Ci4net.com44 incorporation was only one of many factors that were considered. It was
not regarded as a decisive or predominant factor in determining the COMI.45 On the
other hand, it was recently emphasized by the ECJ in the Eurofood case,46 that sub-
stantial evidence is needed in order to rebut the presumption of incorporation.47 And,
38 L Perkins, ‘A Defence of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies’
(2000) 32 NYU J Intl L & Policy 787, 815. See also Skeel (n 35) 463 (arguing that a rule that will
require companies to ﬁle for bankruptcy in their place of incorporation can resolve distortions that
may occur as a result of the mismatch between company and insolvency law, and it will also make
the venue more certain and less manipulable).
39 See also Westbrook, ‘Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm’ (2006–2007) 32 Brook J
Int’l L 1019, 1032 persuasively arguing that incorporation as a strong factor for ascertaining
jurisdiction may have the effect of permitting bankruptcy havens to serve as the chosen juris-
diction, which may lack sufﬁcient transparency and acceptable outcomes.
40 Article 3(1) and Article 3(2) of the EU Regulation.
41 See the deﬁnitions of ‘foreign main proceeding’ and ‘foreign non-main proceeding’ in
Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
42 Article 3(1) and Article 3(2) of the EU Regulation.
43 Under the EU Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law incorporation is also not a
relevant link for the purpose of opening a secondary or ‘non main’ proceedings. Westbrook has
commented that it makes little sense to subject an insolvency process to the laws of a particular
country merely because the company registered there even though the actual commercial life of
the company was centred elsewhere (JL Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum’ (1991) 65 American Bankruptcy L J 457,
486). Within the domestic arena it is interesting to note the American National Bankruptcy
Review Commission recommendation to delete place of incorporation as a sufﬁcient basis for
venue in domestic bankruptcy cases (National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The
Next Twenty Years (1997) 770, 783). However, the American Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act 2005 omitted any amendments to the bankruptcy venue statute (see CJ
Tabb, ‘Courting Failure—The Effects of Venue Choice on Big Bankruptcies’ (2006 National
Bankruptcy Review Commission 2007) 54 Buff L Rev 467, 478 indicating that the senator of
Delaware ‘killed’ any venue amendments).
44 Ci4Net.com. Inc [2005] BCC 277 (Ch D).
45 See also R Tett and N Spence, ‘COMI: PRESUMPTION, WHAT PRESUMPTION’ (2004)
17 Insolvency Int. 46 Eurofood IFSC Ltd (ECJ) [2006] BCC 397.
47 The exemplifying scenario given is that of a ‘letterbox’ company not carrying out any
business in the country of the registered ofﬁce (ibid paras 34–35).
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as has been commented by professor LoPucki48 ‘bankruptcy havens’, in which com-
panies chose to incorporate but hold no signiﬁcant business, still play a role in multi-
national insolvencies.49
Another alternative for determining jurisdiction is the assets-based test (or any test
based on amount of activities, number of creditors etc). This test for jurisdiction is
clearly ﬂawed, mainly as it lacks robustness. Whereas in some speciﬁc circumstances it
is easy to ascertain that most or all of the debtor’s assets or activities are in a particular
country, in many other circumstances this would hardly be the case. Assets and ac-
tivities may be spread among countries with none of them having a clear majority. In
addition, some assets could be of mobile nature and even be outside the boundaries of
any country.50 The need to measure and weigh between quantities entails high level of
complexity which makes the venue unpredictable and prone to manipulations. Basing
jurisdiction on amount of assets would also be problematic as this test could only be
used when insolvency breaks (that is, it has little relevance if tested beforehand as it
reﬂects a dynamic feature in a life of a company) therefore its outcome could not be
predicted ex ante by deﬁnition.
So far we have considered those tests in the context of a single debtor. However,
when dealing with a group scenario applying either the incorporation test or the assets-
based test to determine the proper venue is even less suitable than in the single debtor
case. As aforesaid, the incorporation test focuses on form rather than substance,
therefore may only be ﬁction, ‘surreal’. The test is even more dubious for corporate
groups. The Incorporation test applied to groups will inevitably preclude any global
consideration. The place of incorporation may be different for each entity comprising
the group, since we are dealing with a multinational enterprise whose entities are
spread among various countries. Keep in mind that one of our goals is to ﬁnd a single
focus-point of the entire group, so as to promote cost efﬁcient results. However, MEGs
are not incorporated as such in a particular country so there is no single country that
can be identiﬁed as the place of incorporation of the group. One obvious improvement
could have been referring to the place of incorporation of the parent company of the
MEG which will no doubt improve predicatablity. However, this will bring us back to
the problem of the ineffciency of having the process handled in a place with no real
connection to the group entities. For instance, the parent can be just a holding company
48 LM LoPucki, Courting Failure How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the
Bankruptcy Courts (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2005) 193–200.
49 In the case of ICO Global Communications, for instance, the English court recognized a US
reorganization plan of an essentially English corporation although it had little presence in the US,
mainly because the plan was also approved by the Cayman Islands and Bermudan courts in which
several companies of the ICO group were incorporated (Ibid 197–99). In the SphinX case, a US
chapter 15 case (chapter 15 replaced s 304 to the US Bankruptcy Code and is based on the
UNCITRAL Model law), the US court recognized Cayman Islands liquidations as non-main
proceedings, although there was no economic activity there (necessary in order to show there was
an ‘establishment’ as the basis for identifying non main proceedings) (In re SPhinX 351 BR 103
(Bankr SDNY. 2006)) (D (US))). But, see the decision in the case of Bear Stearns, where the court
refused recognition of insolvency proceedings opened against two Cayman Islands’ hedge funds
incorporated there since no operation has taken place in that jurisdiction (In re Bear Stearns High-
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 BR 122 (Bankr SDNY 2007)). The
decision is under appeal.
50 See LoPucki, Cooperation (n 5) 716 (giving the example of assets which were leases in
satellites orbiting the earth).
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with no signiﬁcant operations, workforce or management. An insolvency process
against a whole group would then be handled or supervised from a place where the
group had no presence whatsoever apart from a ‘letter box’.
In contrast, the assets based test has the capability to apply to the entire group. In
principle, the assets of the entire group could be quantiﬁed. However, in practice this
may prove a Sisyphean task. Individual group’s members may each have its own
principal asset or operation location with no clear mutual locus for the entire group.
Furthermore, trying to identify a single place as the centre of gravity by summing up
the entire group’s assets or operations and the proportionate part located within the
various entities (measuring quantities on a group scale) would require a costly oper-
ation which will result in debatable outcomes. As aforesaid, it will be difﬁcult to
identify the place in which most of the assets of a single debtor reside, and to predict in
advance what will be the evaluation of a future court in this regard. On a group scale
where, for instance, the entities comprising the group were handling a variety of dif-
ferent operations and accordingly owned different sorts of assets or had different kinds
of activities predicting the group’s centre of gravity in advance would be equivalent to
guesswork. Therefore, in principle, these sorts of test at least as stand-alone standard
are problematic when confronted with insolvency goals in the group context.
The concept of COMI is based on the idea that the proposed place for opening
proceedings should be the one to which the debtor is substantially linked.51 In this
respect, as aforesaid, incorporation is only a presumption, and the mere presence of
assets in a particular country is insufﬁcient.52 In essence, this suggests that courts
should look for the centre of the actual main interests of the debtor; however, the exact
meaning of such a centre is somewhat vague. Indeed, the EU Regulation does not
deﬁne what the COMI of a company is. Prima facie, a COMI could be identiﬁed
according to operations (or location of most assets) or otherwise it could be based on
aspects of management.
Nevertheless, both the Report Virgos/Schmit and the Recitals to the EU
Regulation53 stress that the COMI should be at the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of his business on a regular basis and that it should be ascertainable by
third parties.54 Interpretations of the COMI concept embedded in the UNCITRAL
Model Law have also suggested that it directs courts to consider the country where the
51 See IF Fletcher, ‘The European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings’ [2003]
INSOL INTERNATIONAL, Cross-Border Insolvency, 15, 25–26.
52 It is also not enough in order to open a secondary process (see Report Vigros/Schmit (1996)
[hereinafter: Report Vigros/Schmit], which indicates that an ‘establishment’ requires a certain
amount of organisation and stability. Hence, few assets in the country will not sufﬁce for an
international jurisdiction).
53 The two main instruments for interpreting the EU Regulation.
54 Report Virgos/Schmit; Recital 13 of the EU Regulation. See also Virgos, The 1995
European Community Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: an Insider’s View, in: Forum
International, No 25, March 1998, 13, noting with regard to the need that the place will be
ascertainable to third parties that ‘the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his
business and centralizes the management of his affairs (eg contractual and economic activities
with third parties) satisﬁes this requirement; not the place where the assets, whatever their value,
are located, not the place where the goods are manufactured (eg the place of industrial estab-
lishment, etc)’. See also G Moss and Christoph G Paulus, ‘The european insolvency regulation—
the case for urgent reform’ (2006) 19 Insolvency Int 2 (suggesting optional deﬁnitions to COMI
that focus on head ofﬁce functions).
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debtor’s headquarters are located as the country of main insolvency proceedings.55 The
rationale underlying the incorporation presumption discussed above is also derived
from the (not necessarily correct) assumption that normally the registered ofﬁce of the
company will accord with the actual head ofﬁce.56 However, as the idea is to look for
actual place of main interests and not to be satisﬁed with a place of incorporation, if the
actual headquarters are located in a different place than the registered ofﬁce then the
former should prevail.57 Therefore, it seems that in essence, these models seek to look
for the real place from which the business of the debtor was managed- an operational
headquarters rather than a fac¸ade of headquarters, such that can be ascertainable by
third parties. A substantial top-tier management is supposed to be in the chosen venue
along with the central administration of the debtor.
V. GROUP COMI
Since our aim is to identify a single location and preferably place all proceedings of
the group’s members (which are under insolvency) there, it is suggested to use the
concept of a COMI for a debtor in the MEG scenario as well. That is, to identify the
COMI of the group as a whole and to use this location as the proper venue for handling
(or supervising) the MEG’s insolvency proceedings.
However, in order to enhance predictability and control forum shopping the concept
of COMI should be further reﬁned to make it more precise and less manipulable,
particularly in the context of groups. As was evident from the above discussion central
administration has a signiﬁcant role in the application of COMI. I would argue that this
will also prove effective for the case of groups.58 Using the ‘headquarters criterion’
(or the main place of administration of the debtor’s affairs) in the group case will
enable identiﬁcation of the place of command and control of the integrated centralized
group (we will address the scenario of decentralized groups within the next section).
That is, the place from which the business as a whole was actually controlled.
Subsidiaries are generally directed and managed from headquarters of the group en-
terprise. The headquarters may be viewed as the brain and nerve centre, while the
subsidiaries as the limbs.59 Hence, the headquarters reﬂect the ‘meeting point’ for the
various entities. The head ofﬁce criterion should be the main ‘connecting factor’ for
group venue, and it should be identiﬁed considering the group as a whole looking at the
group as an entity for the (limited) purpose of forum identiﬁcation.
55 See Memorandum from Jay L Westbrook to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
(29 July 1997, in National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty
Years (1997), app E-1 at 7. 56 See Report Virgos/Schmit.
57 This interpretation of a ‘company’s place of business’ (in the EC 13th Directive) has been
recently used by the ECJ (Planzer Luxemburg sarl [2007] ECJ, C–73/06, para 63). The court
stressed that a ‘company’s place of business’ should mean the ‘place where the essential decisions
concerning its general management are taken place and where the functions of its central ad-
ministration is exercised’.
58 Subject to certain limitations, as will be elaborated in section VI. This concept has been also
mentioned elsewhere, see eg Mevorach (n 1) 471–478; G Moss, ‘Group Insolvency – Choice of
Forum and Law: the European Experience under the Inﬂuence of English Pragmatism’ (2007) 32
Brook J Inl’l L 1005.
59 See C Tugendhat, The Multinationals (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1971) 22–23.
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Having a decisive factor will then resolve situations where different connecting
factors direct us to different countries. Thus, in a case such as BCCI,60 where factors
point out to different directions (in BCCI the parent company was incorporated in
Luxemburg with a ‘brass plate’ headquarters there, the group’s assets were spread
around the world and operational headquarters were based in London) the country of
principal proceedings should be that in which the actual headquarters were located.61 It
would not be accurate to assert then that the BCCI case demonstrates the impossibility
to identify a single ‘home country’ for a distressed corporate group,62 but rather it
shows that there should be a clearer standard for an acceptable centre. In most cases,
once adopting a clear criterion a single centre will be revealed.
Senior decision-takers may typically be concentrated around the parent company,
though in fact they may have operated in a different location than that where the parent
was incorporated or had business. The parent can be incorporated in one place or have
activities in a particular country while the operational headquarters of the group are
located elsewhere.63 Moreover, the parent entity may actually be just a holding com-
pany with no signiﬁcant operations or workforce. It could also be outside the insol-
vency process if it is solvent. Therefore, focusing on the parent entity as representing
the group centre can be unhelpful. It should be also emphasized that the headquarters
we are looking for are not necessarily those in relation to the entire group which has in
its top the ultimate parent company. When a debtor or a group of debtors ﬁle for
insolvency the ﬁrst step to take is to identify the integrated collapsing MEG to which
they belong (which may also have on top of it other entities not integrated with it or not
under insolvency) and only then to locate the COMI of this speciﬁc group.64 It should
be noted that, if a consistent approach will be taken for identifying the COMI of single
companies, using the head ofﬁce criterion as main factor, then separate decisions about
debtors’ COMI will normally ﬁt with the identiﬁcation of the group COMI in those
scenarios of centralized groups. Considering the group as a whole when determining
the venue, will then only serve as reinforcement to the decision to locate the entities’
COMIs in one place, and will reduce quarrels over jurisdiction. It should also be
reminded that the approach we take here is not of the ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ type, and
alternative solutions are needed to answer the demands of the particular scenario. Thus,
in certain circumstances the headquarters’ location might not be the place in which all
60 Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] 2 WLR 172 (Ch 1996).
61 Indeed, commentators expressed the opinion that England was the actual centre of interests
of the BCCI group although the main proceedings against the group took place in Luxembourg
(see eg Fletcher (n 51) 37).
62 An opinion expressed in LoPucki, Cooperation (n 5) 713–15.
63 In the case of Crisscross for instance, the actual headquarters of the group were in London at
the place of incorporation of one of the group’s subsidiaries but not of the parent company
(Crisscross Telecommunications Group, Re (unreported, 20 May 2003) (Ch D)). In the case of
BCCI the parent company was incorporated in Luxemburg whereas the actual headquarters were
apparently in London (see Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] 2
WLR 172 (Ch 1996)).
64 See, for instance, the case of Brac (Re Brac Rent-A-Car Inc [2003] BCC 248) where the
European operations were in a virtually independent cluster. See also Collins & Aikman corpo-
ration group [2005] EWHC 1754 (Ch D) in which after the ﬁling of chapter 11 proceedings
against the ultimate parent located in the US, the European operations were controlled via head-
quarters in the UK.
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proceedings of all subsidiaries are to be handled, as will be elaborated in the next
section.
Relevant circumstantial pieces may assist in locating the operational headquarters of
the group. This includes: the location where executive meetings were taking place, and
where the ﬁnancial affairs were directed; whether this management had the authority to
direct or coordinate the global business (the various activities of the group companies
throughout the world); whether the registered ofﬁce or another head ofﬁce is actually
the address of principal executive ofﬁces or whether it is only a ‘post box’, and whether
the majority of the administration functions of the companies were conducted from this
place; whether commercial policy was decided at this location; whether key contracts
were subjected to that jurisdiction’s laws. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it
presents several aspects that can usually hold in the identiﬁcation of place of central
control over an integrated group.
Bearing in mind possible errors in locating the COMI, and that there may be difﬁ-
culties on collecting all needed evidence (when we consider a group operation that may
involve numerous entities) at the onset of the proceedings; the standard venue should
incorporate means of correcting error. Namely, it should be possible to transfer the
jurisdiction of the principle process to the appropriate forum, though this possibility
should be carefully used, as it may have implication on the legal regime that will be
applied and may involve signiﬁcant additional costs. Especially when proceedings are
already underway such change should only involve subjecting local proceedings to
the supervision of main jurisdiction rather than altering the locus of the proceedings
altogether.
The merits of the ‘operational headquarters’ criterion as the primary manifestation
of group COMI is now apparent. It enables identiﬁcation of one common place for the
group as a whole, which also represents a real connection to the entire enterprise. This
can therefore accord with the aim of enhancing cost efﬁciency (avoiding multiple
processes or uncoordinated ones) and reducing forum shopping. The ‘head-ofﬁce cri-
terion’ is not formalistic (as is the incorporation test), but rather is based on functional
realities of the group business. It can therefore disregard strategic planning by looking
for the place from which the business as a whole was actually managed. Conscious of
being able itself to be the subject of manipulation the COMI test should be applied
while ignoring cynical attempts to move this centre when anticipating insolvency65 and
by taking an objective point of view when ascertaining jurisdiction as will be elabo-
rated herewith. The registered ofﬁce as a key connecting factor is therefore unhelpful
at least in the context of groups, and even only as a presumption (as contained in
the EU Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law, for single debtors’ COMI). It
focuses on formalities and on the separate entities which may be incorporated in dif-
ferent countries.
Ascertainability to third parties is another component of COMI as it currently in-
terpreted,66 and it was also identiﬁed above as one of the main goals a proper venue
(in the context of groups) should strive to achieve. Though, as argued this should not
be a separate stand alone limb of the test as in any case not all creditors are able to
foresee the location of insolvency proceedings (for example involuntary creditors) no
matter how hard we try. It is suggested that the functional test that refers to central
65 See also Mevorach (n 2) 484. 66 See n 31 and accompanying text.
442 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
administration of the group is more likely to accord with creditors’ legitimate ex-
pectations (comparing to the other alternative tests). It targets the main proceedings at
the actual meeting point of the enterprise in accordance with the way it was handled in
the normal course of business including the way it had dealings with creditors, and it
does not involve the need to ‘weigh’ between amounts of operations or assets in dif-
ferent states, thus it is relatively clear and grounded on objective factors. However, in
order to further ensure that all expectations will be focused on this single location, the
functional test should be combined with a disclosure mechanism, i.e. an obligatory
publication of the group COMI by the relevant companies. This information will then
become available to (voluntary) creditors, ex-ante, and so will enable clear prospect of
the location of proceedings (in case insolvency will occur). It may also be backed by an
externally certiﬁed, systematic conﬁrmation of the correspondence between claimed
COMI and the ongoing realities, dependent upon some annually occurring process
such as the audit.67 Courts determining the proper venue will be able to initially rely on
the COMI published by the group, unless there was convincing proof that the debtor
was ‘living a lie’ (for instance for the purpose of enjoying the advantages of the
bankruptcy haven in which the COMI had been stated to be). In such a case the court
will make use of other evidence related to the organizational structure of the group
(which is in any case simpler to collect and evaluate than engaging in sophisticated
calculations etc.) to identify the place of command and control over the group. Most
importantly, the idea of considering the group as a whole when determining venue will
mean having a global look and taking an objective viewpoint when examining COMI
on a group scale, considering the position of connected afﬁliates and their creditors.
This will include having regard to interests of creditors not present in court as they may
have not been able to participate in a foreign remote process. This stands in the core of
the fairness goal in the context of jurisdiction of groups as identiﬁed above. It is also
crucial for the goal of tackling forum shopping, as it avoids resting solely on subjective
accounts of either creditors or debtors regarding jurisdiction presented to local courts
and it takes into account the situation of all relevant entities even those not having ﬁled
yet for insolvency.
The ECJ judgment in Eurofood 68 implies a different approach. This was part of the
Parmalat saga, and involved a ‘jurisdictional quarrel’ among the Italian and Irish courts
over one of Parmalt’s subsidiaries. The ECJ held that Ireland had jurisdiction over that
subsidiary (as Eurofood was Irish in the sense that it was incorporated in Ireland and
creditors viewed the companies’ centre as being located in Ireland) not Italy, where the
parent and the group operational headquarters were located. The ECJ was more con-
cerned at looking at factors relating to the particular subsidiary than at locating a place
common for the entire group. It seems that at the core of this decision lays an ‘entity’
approach (strict adherence to the notion of separation between companies comprising
groups), thus the interrelations among group members receive little consideration.
Though the court has not disqualiﬁed ‘parental control’ over a subsidiary as a relevant
factor in determining the proper jurisdiction, the focus was on the whereabouts of
the registered ofﬁce and operations of the particular subsidiary.69 This approach was
67 And accompanied by suitable sanctions (aimed at compensating the creditors) in case of
false representation of the COMI against those responsiple for enabling the company to perpetrate
such a deception. 68 Eurofood IFSC Ltd (ECJ) [2006] BCC 397.
69 ibid paras 26–37.
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followed by the Dutch court in the case of BenQ.70 The court took jurisdiction over the
parent company of that group based on the fact that the company had its registered
ofﬁce in the Netherlands and it performed some activities there, knowable to third
parties, notwithstanding the fact that the group was managed from Munich. Evidently,
this ‘Eurofood approach’ may tend to put signiﬁcant weight on the test of incorpo-
ration,71 which is a rather obstructive element of COMI especially in the group context,
as mentioned above. It also emphasizes ‘ascertainability to third parties’ but without
taking into account the nature of the group and what creditors’ expectations should
mean in this respect. Perhaps not surprisingly this demonstrates the importance of the
taking a global view point, as such an approach is not supplied within the Regulation.
However, a close inspection of numerous cases both within and outside the EU (pre
and post Eurofood ), involving MEGs, reveals a tendency to try and place proceedings
of group members in the jurisdiction in which the management and control of the group
was situated. In Crisscross,72 for instance, the actual headquarters of the group were
located in England. The English High Court placed all the companies under insolvency
in England based on the ﬁnding that each of the separate companies had its COMI
there, although subsidiaries were incorporated in different countries. In Re Parmalat
Hungary/Slovakia73 the Hungarian court based his decision to open main proceedings
against the Slovakian subsidiary of the Hungarian parent company in Hungary mainly
on the fact that the ﬁnancial affairs of the subsidiary were directed from Hungary and
the main decisions were taken from there.74 In the case of Bramalea, a United States–
Canadian group of companies,75 Canada was the jurisdiction supervising the re-
organization. Although the day-to-day operations of US afﬁliates were carried out and
managed locally, strategic decisions were likely dealt in Toronto, where the group’s
head ofﬁce was located.76 Another example is the Energotech case,77 where a Polish
subsidiary was placed under insolvency in France where the headquarters of the parent
were located and as the subsidiary was dependant on its parent (i.e. it was an integrated
group).78 This tendency of courts to place insolvency proceedings of related companies
70 BenQ Mobile GmbH & Co OHG [a trading partnership] and BenQ Mobile Holding BV,
Docket No 1503 IE 4371/05 Munich, 5 February 2007.
71 The decision is somewhat mitigated in this respect by the subsequent decision of the ECJ
in Planzer Luxemburg Sarl ([2007] ECJ, C–73/06). In interpreting the meaning of place of
company’s business (in the 13th EC Directive) the court explained that primary factors are
the registered ofﬁce but also the place of the company’s central administration and other factors
(and it refers by analogy to the decision in Eurofood). The case was not concerned though with
the corporate group complications.
72 Re Crisscross Telecommunications Group (unreported, 20 May 2003), Ch D.
73 Re Parmalat Hungary/Slovakia, Municipality Court of Fejer, 14 June 2004.
74 It also examined whether the designated forum was ascertainable by third parties.
75 An unreported case in the Ontario Court of Justice (for a description and discussion of the
case see R Gordon Marantz, ‘The Reorganization of a Complex Corporate Entity: The Bramalea
Story’ in JS Ziegel (ed), Case Studies in Recent Canadian Insolvency Reorganizations (Carswell,
Toronto, 1997)). 76 ibid 17–18.
77 Energotech SARL [2007] BCC 123.
78 Proceedings of afﬁliated companies were also placed at the location of main decision
making in other EU Regulation cases, such as Daisytek (Re Daisytek–ISA Ltd [2003] BCC 562
(Ch D)); Cirio Del Monte (Cirio del Monte (Italian court of Rome, August, 2003) (unreported));
Hettlage-Austraia (Amtsgericht (Munich) (Hettlage-Austria) (unreported, 4 May 2004)
(Germany)); Collins & Aikman corporation group [2005] EWHC 1754 (Ch); Eurotunnel Finance
Ltd (Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 2 Aug 2006) (unreported); MPOTEC GMBH (Tribunal de
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at the state in which they were all managed correlates with the idea of looking for the
centre of main administration of a debtor and it provides the opportunity to place all
the proceedings of the group’s members in one place which reﬂects a connection to the
group as a whole.
In sum, the place from which the group affairs were managed and operationally
controlled reﬂects most suitably the heart and core of the integrated centralized en-
terprise, its centre and meeting point. Hence, it can be regarded as the place of stron-
gest connection to the group as such. It would also be the easiest to identify (and to
predict) as the future jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings of the integrated group. It
would also accord with the true way in which the business has been operated prior to its
fall. Therefore, this is an efﬁcacious test that can fulﬁl the various goals of an inter-
national insolvency system, and assist in applying an effective global approach.
VI. LIMITATIONS TO THE ‘HEAD-OFFICE’ CRITERION
As was evident from our discussion at the outset of this paper on MEG operational
structures, the scene of MEG insolvency is very much diversiﬁed. Therefore, it is ill
advised to treat the MEG as a single and unique scenario. Rather, it may take many
forms and shapes. Hence, it is necessary to ascertain when the tools and tests proposed
(particularly our ‘head-ofﬁce’ criterion) are appropriate and when they are less so.
A. ‘Balance of Connections’
There may be a particular scenario (a ‘hard case’) in which although the head ofﬁce of
an MEG is in a certain country and it is real and operational, all the subsidiaries are
located in another country, together with all the creditors, assets and operations of the
group. In this situation the nexus to each of the two jurisdictions may be actually equal,
even when looking at the group and its stakeholders as a whole. To illustrate, if all the
subsidiaries of a group are incorporated in France, the bulk of assets is there and all
creditors are there, however the operational headquarters is in Germany, then there is a
case to look at France as an appropriate venue for the group’s insolvency as well, as the
German headquarters are in fact ‘isolated’ (although not a fac¸ade) and as all other
factors lead to France (so that it is almost a case of a (French) domestic group).
It will be sensible in such scenarios to equip courts with further discretion to defer to
the proximate jurisdiction to which the group has many connections. Perhaps an even
more appropriate approach to these cases is to decide on a parallel process, conducting
insolvency proceedings in both countries, while considering the entire circumstances
of the case. The court may take into account any agreements the parties may have
reached regarding the jurisdiction to assist in the decision. It should be emphasized
though, that this is a scenario very different than the cases where the constituent
companies are spread in a number of countries; assets are located in various places and
Grande Instance, Nanterre [2006] BCC 681 (Fr). See also, G Moss and M Haravon, ‘Building
Europe — the French Case Law on COMI’ (2007) Insolvency Intelligence; Moss (n 58)
(demonstrating the wide adoption in Europe of ‘English Pragmatism)’, ie placing proceedings of
related companies in the place of the head-ofﬁce to facilitate centralization of group insolvency
proceedings).
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so on. Then, the headquarters, as aforesaid, are certainly the best factor connecting the
group to a single venue.
The case ofMaxwell79 may demonstrate a scenario of such a ‘balance of connecting
factors’. The Maxwell group had most of its important subsidiaries located and man-
aged in the US but on the other hand the parent company was incorporated in the UK
and the UK was the ﬁnancial and governance centre of the entire group. Indeed, from
the point of view of the relevant courts, both the American and the UK court believed
they had an interest in handling the case.80 Although it can be convincingly argued that
the English court should have been the designated venue as the place of central ad-
ministration,81 there is also a strong case in favour of the US jurisdiction where all the
substance of the group business was located. The approach that was taken in this case-
that is, using ‘parallel’ process and inter-court collaboration therefore made sense.82 It
can be conceptualized that it was a way to imitate the economic reality of this par-
ticular scenario (the actual strong connections the group had to these two places in a
rather equal manner), therefore it was efﬁcient and met creditors’ expectations. In such
instances the idea of direct communication can assist in preventing jurisdictional
‘battles’ and jointly agree on the suitable way to administer the case.83
B. Decentralized Groups
It was mentioned earlier (when considering what constitutes an MEG) that in certain
circumstances, although the enterprise at hand (the insolvent MEG) is integrated it may
have a decentralized operational structure, with self-standing units of decision-takers.
The question is whether the headquarters criterion (applied to groups) can ﬁt with this
scenario. It is suggested that it is. The headquarters criterion is suitable for such op-
erational structures as well, only now the proper venue may assume a somewhat dif-
ferent role. This time, looking at the head ofﬁce’s location as the centre of coordination
(rather than centre of control) and designating the venue as holding the principal in-
solvency process. However, as divisions of the group were managed as autonomic
units it may mean that the relevant entities will have strong mutual connections to the
local management in terms of the way creditors dealt with the entities, the applicable
law, the availability of information etc. To achieve efﬁciency and meet reasonable
expectations, local insolvency proceedings against local subsidiaries can then be
opened in the place of the regional head-ofﬁce or main management of the particular
subsidiary (the subsidiary’s separate COMIs), while still referred to one insolvency
79 Maxwell Communication Corp 170 BR 800 (Bankruptcy SDNY 1994); Maxwell
Communication Corp (1993) 1 WLR 1402 (Ch 1993).
80 See also Ziegel (n 4) 379.
81 See JL Westbrook, ‘The Lessons of Maxwell Communication’ (1996) 64 Fordham L Rev
2531, 2538. 82 See Ziegel (n 4) 379.
83 See eg the use of such tool in the case of Cenargo (Re Cenargo International plc 294 BR 571
(Bankr SDNY 2003); Cenargo (Re Norse Irish Ferries & Cenargo Navigtion Limited (unreported,
20 February 2003)). There, the ‘battle’ over jurisdiction has been solved by the respective judges
(from the US and the UK) holding a conference call in which they agreed a number of key
jurisdictional differences. See also court-to-court communication that took place recently between
Dutch and German courts in the case of BenQ (BenQ Mobile GmbH & Co OHG [a trading
partnership] and BenQ Mobile Holding BV, Docket No 1503 IE 4371/05 Munich, 5 February
2007).
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venue having the supervisory role over the entire process. As explained previously, in
the ‘coordinated groups’ the head ofﬁce coordinates the entire operation (whereas in
the centralized MEGs the head ofﬁce is the ultimate policy-maker and directing
‘brain’) with the subsidiaries having signiﬁcant autonomy in their management. Hence,
though the role of the headquarters is operationally different it still reﬂects the meeting
point of the various companies and the most signiﬁcant connection the integrated
group as a whole has to a particular place. Here as well, the headquarters test (in its
speciﬁc characteristic as coordinator and supervisor) will accord with the way the
business was actually operating. The same idea applies to those ‘mixed’ scenarios
where the entire group is coordinated via a global headquarters, though there are cen-
tralized regional sub-groups. Each of these independent (to some degree) units can be
handled centrally at the venue of their head ofﬁce, while maintaining the linkage to the
ultimate coordinator, if the latter was part of the integrated collapsing group. Of course
if there is only one such sub-group (and no global operation to coordinate) then the
local centralized process will sufﬁce.
C. Where There Is No Single Centre of Control or Coordination
In certain scenarios the MEG may have had more than one head ofﬁce managing the
group operations. The business may have been split organizationally, and controlled
via two (or several) sets of managements. Or, the group may have been structured in a
way that there was no single entity exercising control over subsidiaries, but rather more
than one parent that actually controlled the group, via separate headquarters. We
mentioned earlier trans-national mergers in which two or more parent ﬁrms integrate
their business operations and jointly hold a company. This could be done for instance
in an international joint venture where two or more parents from different countries
cooperate to pursue a commonly commercial activity. Another example is a ‘twin
holding structure’ where two parent companies transfer the operating activities to
subsidiaries that may be jointly owned and controlled by the holding companies.84
Thus, instead of having one ‘head’ and ‘brain’ controlling or coordinating the entire
group (in its ordinary course of business), there are in fact two (or more) heads for the
enterprise. This may actually represent a non integrated group, however to the extent
that the different headquarters coordinated the management of the group to create a
single group business,85 a uniﬁed approach will be beneﬁcial and it will be advan-
tageous to place the related companies’ insolvencies in a single place or to have them
all coordinated by a supervisory authority. However, in such scenarios, the head-
quarters criterion may not be easy to use for locating the appropriate venue to handle
the insolvency proceedings against the group. The alternative tests based on location of
assets and activities, whereabouts of creditors, and where the companies were incor-
porated (that normally should be regarded ‘second best’) should receive in such cir-
cumstances a greater role, for the purpose of identifying the centre of gravity. It may be
possible to point to one of the ‘heads’ as the centre, with the major volume of assets
and activities on the group level and/or incorporated entities and so forth located there.
84 See Muchlinski (n 12) 59–60.
85 See, for instance, the case of the Unilever group in J Keir, ‘Legal Problems in the
Management of a Group of Companies’ in CM Schmitthoff and F Wooldridge (eds), Groups of
Companies (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1991).
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However, those tests are difﬁcult to apply, here too a parallel process might be ade-
quate. That is, conducting two or more main proceedings to coordinate the group
insolvency in the location of the headquarters. It may actually imitate the economic
reality of the group (in its ordinary course of business) more accurately, and again will
use the same standard venue (although duplicated). Indeed, if the latter is accompanied
with effective means of communication as mentioned above it can still achieve a
signiﬁcant degree of coordination.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The question of the ‘appropriate venue’ is essential when applying a global approach to
insolvencies within MEGs which strives to fulﬁl insolvency goals by linking between
the allegedly disjointed. This was the incentive for the search for a standard test for
group venue. Although several such tests were suggested previously in consideration
of a single multinational debtor it is increasingly accepted that the idea of Centre of
Main Interest is the most appropriate one for the single debtor case. Implementing the
concept of COMI to the MEG scenario through the use of the ‘head-ofﬁce’ test as the
embodiment of COMI we can end up with the best efﬁcacious test for identifying the
proper venue. This standard test enables to locate one common venue for a group
(either common coordinator or a venue in which to place all proceedings); it is likely to
accord with creditors’ legitimate expectations especially if combined with disclosure
mechanisms; it is relatively clear and objective and it could prove effective in handling
forum manipulations. However, we must also realise its limitations and accommodate
those speciﬁc cases when this test might not be practical or appropriate, at least not to
its full extent. Certain MEG structures may suggest using alternative tests to locate the
centre of gravity, or where this is unattainable, achieving coordination while having a
parallel process.
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